Family Law Tentative Rulings
Family Law Tentative Ruling Announcements
The family court issues tentative ruling announcements on the court day prior to the scheduled hearing for specific types of motions. Tentative rulings are only provided on the Internet and posted in the clerk’s office lobby. Internet postings occur at 3:30 p.m. daily.
Parties are not required to give notice of intent to appear to preserve the right to a hearing. The tentative ruling will not become final until the hearing. (Stan. Cnty. Local Rules, rule 7.05.1) However, as a courtesy to the Court, and other parties or counsel with matters on calendar, notice of intended appearance or non-appearance is encouraged and may be sent by e-mail to the following address: familylaw.tentatives@stanct.org between the hours of 1:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. If you do not receive a confirmation e-mail from the clerk, you may call to speak directly with a Calendar Clerk at 209-530-3107.
Any party filing pleadings or documents on a tentative ruling matter within five (5) days of the hearing should provide a courtesy copy to the Courtroom Clerk and the Court’s Family Law Research Attorney by placing a copy in the drop box slot on the door of Room 223, Second Floor of the main Courthouse. Failure to do so may prevent the Court from consideration of such, may result in a continuance, and/or may be considered in the award of conduct-based fees and costs. (Stan. Cnty. Local Rules, rule 7.05.1(B).)
All parties and counsel are required to meet and confer in a good faith effort to resolve the dispute on any request, motion or hearing, with the exception of those involving domestic violence, and to exchange any documents upon which reliance will be made at the hearing. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 5.98; Stan. Cnty. Local Rules, rule 7.05.1(C).) Failure to do so may result in a continuance and may be considered in the award of conduct-based fees and costs, or both. If sufficient information regarding an adequate pre-hearing meet and confer effort is not provided in the moving and opposing papers, in the Court’s discretion, the matter may be placed at the end of the calendar and not called until the parties or counsel advise the Court that they have complied with their obligations and/or resolved the matter.
The following are the tentative ruling cases calendared before Judge Alan Cassidy in Department #11:
THERE ARE NO TENTATIVES.
The following are the tentative ruling cases calendared before Judge J. Richard Distaso in Department #13:
THERE ARE NO TENTATIVES.
The following are the tentative ruling cases calendared before Judge Sweena Pannu in Department #14:
THERE ARE NO TENTATIVES.
The following are the tentative ruling cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department #25:
FL-23-000904 – GODINEZ VS GODINEZ
Petitioner’s Request for Order re Leave to Amend—HEARING REQUIRED.
The original Petition for Dissolution was filed on April 5, 2023, and alleged the date of separation to be September 20, 2021.
Petitioner then filed an Amended Petition for Dissolution on April 27, 2023, and alleged the same date of separation.
The Response to the Amended Petition was filed on May 18, 2023, and Respondent alleged the date of separation to be November 2, 2022.
Petitioner requests leave to file a second amended petition in order to change the alleged date of separation to April 22, 2023. Petitioner states that his original pleadings were filed without the benefit of counsel and he now believes the date he selected was inaccurate.
Respondent opposes the request, citing the definition of the date of separation in Family Code section 70, and argues that the date of separation under this definition is the date that she allegedly discovered Petitioner’s infidelity—the date of separation alleged in her Response—and that Petitioner moved out of the marital residence on her demand, after which the parties no longer resided together up to and including the present.
Initially, the Court notes that there are significant procedural defects in the request. Petitioner does not specify the new date that Petitioner believes to be correct and, instead, states “See attached Amended Summons and Petition.” However, the order request that Petitioner filed and that has been entered into the Court’s docket has no such attachments. Moreover, Petitioner’s proof of service for the subject order request does not aver service of any proposed amended petition and/or summons. But in cases under the Family Code, the rules for amended and supplemental pleadings are the same as those in civil cases generally, which (a) require the filing and service of the proposed amended pleading and (b) require the filing and service of a declaration that states (i.) the effect of the amendment, (ii.) why the amendment is necessary and proper, (iii.) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered, and (iv.) the reasons why the request for leave to amend was not made at an earlier time. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(a)(1); Fam. Code, § 210; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1324(a) [Contents of motion], (b) [Supporting declaration], and rule 5.74(c)(1) [amendment to pleadings to be made “in conformity with the provisions of law applicable to such matters in civil actions generally”].) Here, in addition to not having apparently complied with the requirement to file and serve a proposed amended pleading, Petitioner’s declaration is both cursory and omits any allegations regarding the showing required by rule 3.1324(b)(1)-(4). At a minimum, these defects would justify the Court exercising discretion to deny the motion without prejudice.
However, there is a well-settled and longstanding judicial policy of liberally granting leave to amend so that cases are decided on their merits and that all parties and any related claims may be brought forth in a single action. (Mabie v. Hyatt (1988) 61 Cal.App.4th 581, 596; Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428; see, Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial (TRG 2024) Ch. 6-E, § 6:638.)
Respondent’s opposition does not claim any prejudice from the timing of the motion and simply argues that her version of the circumstances surrounding the parties’ separation is accurate whereas the date that Petitioner wishes to allege is not. But it is not the function of the pleadings to establish the ultimate facts in the case, one way or the other. Rather, the purpose is simply to put the parties on notice as to the contested issues in the case which, in Family Law cases, is accomplished by the use of mandatory Judicial Council forms. And since, unlike the majority of pleadings in general civil cases, the petition and response forms must be verified by the parties, it necessarily follows that there is a greater risk of the pleadings resulting in binding judicial admissions if an erroneous allegation that has been made is not corrected.
Given the import of the date of separation to the determination of critical issues in dissolution proceedings, Petitioner’s desire to amend the pleadings to state what he now believes is the accurate date of separation is, at the very least, understandable. (See, Marriage of Manfer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 925, 928 [noting in a case where several hundred thousands of dollars depended on it, “the date of separation can be of considerable consequence with regard to the parties' property rights”].) It is for this very reason that bifurcation and separate trial of the date of separation is by express mention deemed a “pivotal issue” especially worthy of early adjudication in the interests of judicial economy and expediting resolution of the support and property issues that depend on a date certain for the parties’ marital separation. (See, Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 5.390(b)(2).)
Accordingly, counsel are directed to meet and confer on the date of separation and, absent agreement, are invited to be heard on whether bifurcation and early trial of the date of separation is appropriate, whether sua sponte or by stipulation, particularly in light of the “totality of the circumstances” evidentiary hearing that is mandated of the trial court due to the so-called “anti-Davis” amendment to section 70. (Fam. Code, § 70(c) [“It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to abrogate the decisions in In re Marriage of Davis (2015) 61 Cal.4th 846 and In re Marriage of Norviel (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1152”].)
FL-23-000323 – MEAD VS MEAD
Petitioner’s Request for Order re Elisor—HEARING REQUIRED.
Petitioner filed the instant order request on May 1, 2024. The Court granted an order shortening time. The proof of service filed by Petitioner by law establishes prima facie evidence of the validity of service. Respondent’s allegation of non-service of the order request contrary to the filed proof of service is a matter that must be proved to the Court’s satisfaction before consequences as to the merits and the prejudice, if any, are weighed by the Court. That said, the “Reply Declaration of Respondent,” etc., filed on May 13, 2024, is an inappropriate and unauthorized filing. Use of the Judicial Council form Responsive Declaration (FL-320) is mandatory to respond or oppose a Request for Order. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 5.92.)
It is disconcerting that, instead of addressing the merits of Petitioner’s request for an elisor, Respondent chooses again to focus only on legal arguments regarding procedural technicalities and to weaponize the alleged procedural defects by seeking conduct-based sanctions. (Fam. Code, § 271.) The Court directs counsel to meet and confer—in good faith—on the merits of whether an elisor will be necessary in light of the Court’s Findings and Order After Hearing of April 16, 2024.
FL-23-000625 – AUSTIN-HASTON VS HASTON
Continued Hearing on Petitioner’s Request for Order re Elisor—HEARING REQUIRED.
As per the Court’s Findings and Order After Hearing of May 6, 2024, this is the final hearing that the Court will hold prior to granting Petitioner’s request, as was the Court’s initial tentative ruling. No further continuances will be granted to Respondent absent a demonstration of due diligence and irreparable prejudice should a continuance be denied. Respondent has been twice admonished and the Petitioner’s right to a reasonably expeditious remedy must also be considered.