April 30, 2024

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-22-005315 – CARRILLO, JOSE vs CARRILLO PAULA – Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Moving Counsel’s unopposed motion to be relieved as counsel is GRANTED, effective on the filing of a proof showing service of the signed order on the client. However, the Court notes that the client is a trustee, not just an individual, and therefore should immediately seek legal advice regarding representation.

The Court will sign the proposed order that Moving Counsel filed with the motion, adding the above note.

CV-24-000171 – HERNANDEZ, JOSE V vs SCHNITZER STEEL INDUSTRIES INC – Defendants, Pick-N-Pull Auto Dismantlers LLC and Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay or Dismiss Proceedings – DENIED.

Defendants’ objections to the Hernandez declaration: All OVERRULED.

Defendants’ objections to the Zavala declaration: SUSTAINED as to items 4 and 5. OVERRULED as to all else.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that Defendants have failed to clarify whether the Plaintiff viewed the English- or Spanish-language version of the arbitration agreement. It appears from the record that it was the Spanish version, though that is unclear.

If Defendant does not know which version it is, the use of the English version is additional evidence that Plaintiff did not personally agree to arbitration. If it is the Spanish version, such version should have been provided and certified translation generated under Rule of Court 3.1110(g).

The Court treats this motion as a petition under Code Civ. Proc. section 1281.2. The threshold question is whether a valid agreement existed.

Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Plaintiff has adequately shown that his supervisor, at a minimum, knew his password, and that others regularly logged into the training platform for him. This version of the facts is corroborated by a declaration from Plaintiff’s then-supervisor. Furthermore, both Plaintiff and his then-supervisor deny that Plaintiff ever viewed the Arbitration Program. In addition, Plaintiff’s then-supervisor, who was also a non-exempt, non-union employee, asserts that he, too, “was never presented with an arbitration agreement and related computer program in 2021, or at any time for that matter ….” (4/16/24 Zavala Decl. ¶ 22.)

Plaintiff notes that it appears from the documentation that the six-page agreement was processed in about two minutes. The document is dense and not susceptible to understanding in two minutes. This supports Plaintiff’s claim.

Further, the document has an express method of validation: A signature, including an electronic, PDF, or facsimile signature. There are no such signatures. Defendant cites to Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4^th 223, 236 for the proposition that a party’s acceptance can be implied in fact. But assuming Plaintiff read the contract carefully, reviewed it, and then finished the online segment, he would be aware that the signature requirement existed and would not consider the matter agreed to until he had signed. Defendant’s own contract sets the requirement for enforcement.

Defendant’s other cases fare no better; in this case the contract itself sets the terms of validating it. Neither Defendant nor Plaintiff made an effort to do so.  

As these issues resolve that no agreement existed, the Court does not reach the additional issues presented by the parties.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

***There are no Tentative Rulings in Department 22***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John D. Freeland in Department 23:

***There are no Tentative Rulings in Department 23***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-20-004979 – QUILENDERINO, ALEX vs MB2 RACEWAY MODESTO INC – Cross-Defendant’s Demurrer to Cross Complaint – SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

The Court finds that generally, an indemnification provision allows one party to recover costs incurred defending actions by third parties, not attorney fees incurred in an action between the parties to the contract. Furthermore, a clause that contains the words “indemnify” and “hold harmless” as here, generally obligates the indemnitor to reimburse the indemnitee for any damages the indemnitee becomes obligated to pay third persons—that is, it relates to third party claims, not attorney fees incurred in a breach of contract action between the parties to the indemnity agreement itself. (Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Servs., LLC, (2016) 4 Cal. App. 5th 574; Carr Bus. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Chowchilla, (2008)166 Cal. App. 4th 14).

The Court further finds that while a contractual indemnity provision may be drafted either to cover claims between the contracting parties themselves, or to cover claims asserted by third parties, the Court may not infer that the parties intended an indemnification provision to cover attorney fees between the parties if the provision does not specifically provide for attorney fees in an action on the contract.( Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Servs., LLC, (2016) 4 Cal. App. 5th 574; Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theater, (2004) 124 Cal. App. 4th 547, 556).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the indemnity provision at issue does not specifically provide for attorney fees in an action on the contract.

The Court therefore finds that Cross-Complainant Cross Complaint fails to state a cause of action against Cross-Defendant. (Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10). Accordingly, Cross-Defendant’s demurrer to Cross-Complainant’s First Amended Cross Complaint is hereby sustained, with leave to amend.

The Court also finds that Cross-Defendant is not entitled to attorney fees. (Civil Code Section 1717). 

CV-22-002302 – ROCHA, FERNANDO vs TRUJILLO, DIANA LISBBETH HERNANDEZ – Defendant, On Trac Logistics, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings – DENIED

The Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the 9^th Circuit Court of Appeals as expressed in Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide 976 F.3d 1016, 1026 (9^th Cir. 2020). Specifically, the Court finds that while the negligence claims at issue are subject to the preemption provision contained in the Federal Aviation Administration Authority Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 14501(c)(1)), the allegations herein fall within the scope of the Act’s “safety” exemption (49 U.S.C.A. § 14501(c)(2)(A)). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims herein are saved from preemption via application of the subject exemption.

While the Court notes the criticism of Miller’s purported reliance on the “preemption presumption” as mentioned in the subsequent opinion in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. County of Los Angeles 29 F.4^th 542 (9^th Cir. 2022), it appears to this Court that the result in Miller was not dependent on application of the presumption and is supported by that opinion’s discussion of relevant precedent and congressional intent with regard to the scope of the exemption as expressed in the statutory language of the Act.

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED as to Exhibits B, D, and E. With regard to Exhibit C, the Request in GRANTED, in part, only to the extent that the Court takes notice of the existence of the subject declaration in the Court’s file; however, the Court declines to take judicial notice of the truth of the declaration’s contents. (See, e.g. Bach v. McNelis (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 852, 865.)

CV-23-005988 – FLORES, ABEL vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Verifications and Further Responses and Documents to Requests for Production Nos. 1, 3, 9, 17, 37-51, 54, 59-63, and 65 – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Verification and Further Responses to Special Interrogatories 14, 40-43, 45, 52-59 – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

a) The Court notes Defendant’s Counsel’s allegations that Plaintiff’s Counsel failed to engage in proper meet and confer, as well as Defendant’s Counsel’s claims that Defendant “routinely agrees to supplement its discovery responses by producing further documents under the Protective Order”.

In view of Defendant’s Counsel’s expressed willingness to meet and confer, and his assertions of being denied the opportunity to do so, the Court hereby orders the parties to engage in further meet and confer in the expectation that the parties will make substantial progress in resolving the discovery dispute herein. Should the parties return to Court with this discovery dispute unresolved, the Court advises that claims of privilege, confidentiality and trade secrets will be required to be suitably supported.

This matter is accordingly continued to June 11, 2024, at 8:30 am in Department 24.

b) The Court notes Defendant’s Counsel’s allegations that Plaintiff’s Counsel failed to engage in proper meet and confer, as well as Defendant’s Counsel’s claims that ‘Defendant routinely agrees to supplement its discover responses by producing further documents under the Protective Order.

In view of Defendant’s Counsel’s expressed willingness to meet and confer, the Court hereby orders the parties to engage in further meet and confer in the expectation that the parties will make substantial progress in resolving the discovery dispute herein.

Should the parties return to Court with the discovery dispute unresolved, the Court advises that claims of privilege, confidentiality and trade secrets will be required to be suitably supported.

This matter is accordingly continued to June 11, 2024, at 8:30 am in Department 24.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings in Department 19***